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Abstract
We study the ensemble performance of biometric authentication systems, based on secret key
generation, which work as follows. In the enrollment stage, an individual provides a biometric
signal that is mapped into a secret key and a helper message, the former being prepared to
become available to the system at a later time (for authentication), and the latter is stored in
a public database. When an authorized user requests authentication, claiming his/her identity
as one of the subscribers, s/he has to provide a biometric signal again, and then the system,
which retrieves also the helper message of the claimed subscriber, produces an estimate of the
secret key, that is finally compared to the secret key of the claimed user. In case of a match,
the authentication request is approved, otherwise, it is rejected. Referring to an ensemble of
systems based on Slepian–Wolf binning, we provide a detailed analysis of the false–reject and
false–accept probabilities, for a wide class of stochastic decoders. We also comment on the
security for the typical code in the ensemble.
Index Terms: biometric security, Slepian-Wolf coding, random binning, error exponents, se-
crete key generation.
I. Introduction
We consider a biometric authentication system that is described in [7, Sections 2.2–2.6], which is
based on the notion of secret key generation and sharing due to Maurer [8] and Ahlswede and
Csisza´r [1], [2]. Specifically, such a system works as follows. In the enrollment stage, an individual
which subscribes to the system provides a biometric signal, X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xn). The system
receives this signal and generates (using its encoder) two outputs in response. The first output
is a secret key, S, at rate Rs and the second is a helper message, W , at rate Rw. The secret
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key is prepared in order to be used by the system later, at the authentication stage. The helper
message is stored in a public database. When an authorized user (a subscriber) wishes to sign
in, claiming his/her identity as one of the existing subscribers, s/he is requested to provide again
his/her biometric signal, Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) (correlated to X , if indeed from the same individual, or
independent, if not). The system then retrieves the helper message W of the claimed subscriber,
and responds (using its decoder) by estimating the secret key, Sˆ (based on (Y ,W )), and comparing
it to the secret key of the claimed user, S. In case of a match, access to the system is granted,
otherwise, it is denied.
In [7, Sect. 2.3], achievable rate pairs (Rs, Rw) were found for the existence of systems (encoders
and decoders) that satisfy the following three requirements in the large n limit: (i) arbitrarily small
false–reject (FR) probability, (ii) arbitrarily small false–accept (FA) probability, and (iii) arbitrarily
small leakage between the secret message and the helper message, in terms of the asymptotic
normalized mutual information, I(S;W )/n. In particular, Theorem 2.1 of [7] asserts that when
(X ,Y ) are drawn from a discrete memoryless source (DMS), generating independent copies of a
correlated pair (X,Y ) ∼ PXY , the maximum achievable key rate, Rs, under the above constraints,
is given by the single–letter mutual information, I(X;Y ). It then follows that Rw must lie in the
range H(X|Y ) < Rw < H(X) − Rs, where the conditional entropy in the lower limit is essential
for reliable identification of an authorized subscriber (small FR probability) and the upper limit is
essential for the security requirement. These limitations already guarantee that Rw < H(X), which
is essential for keeping the FA probability vanishingly small for large n.
As in many proofs of direct coding theorems in the information theory literature, in the achiev-
ability part of [7, Theorem 2.1] too, the analyses of the error probabilities (in this case, the FA
and the FR probabilities) are very rough – they are merely good enough to prove the achievability
of the desired coding rates in the simplest possible manner. However, these are poor estimates of
the achievable FR and FA probabilities themselves when these are considered to be the relevant
performance metrics for given Rs and Rw.
The purpose of this paper is to provide sharper evaluations of the ensemble performance of the
FA and the FR probabilities. In particular, referring to an ensemble of systems based on Slepian–
Wolf binning, we provide detailed analyses of the exponential behavior of the FR probability, for
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a wide class of stochastic decoders, which includes the respective maximum a posteriori (MAP)
decoder as a special case. An expurgated bound is provided as well and discussed quite in detail.
For the FA probability, we analyze the ensemble performance of the MAP decoder and provide
some intuition concerning its behavior. We also comment on the security of the code for the typical
code in the ensemble.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we establish the notation conventions. In
Section III, we formalize the setup and spell out the objectives. In Section IV, we present and
discuss the random coding FR exponent and an expurgated bound. In Section V, we derive the
random coding FA exponent, and finally, in Section VI, we discuss the leakage of the typical code.
II. Notation Conventions
Throughout the paper, random variables will be denoted by capital letters, specific values they may
take will be denoted by the corresponding lower case letters, and their alphabets will be denoted by
calligraphic letters. Random vectors and their realizations will be denoted, respectively, by capital
letters and the corresponding lower case letters, both in the bold face font. Their alphabets will
be superscripted by their dimensions. For example, the random vector X = (X1, . . . ,Xn), (n –
positive integer) may take a specific vector value x = (x1, . . . , xn) in X
n, the n–th order Cartesian
power of X , which is the alphabet of each component of this vector. Sources and channels will be
denoted by the letter P or Q, subscripted by the names of the relevant random variables/vectors
and their conditionings, if applicable, following the standard notation conventions, e.g., QX , PY |X ,
and so on. When there is no room for ambiguity, these subscripts will be omitted. The probability
of an event G will be denoted by Pr{G}, and the expectation operator with respect to (w.r.t.) a
probability distribution P will be denoted by EP {·}. Again, the subscript will be omitted if the
underlying probability distribution is clear from the context. The entropy of a generic distribution
Q on X will be denoted by HQ(X). For two positive sequences an and bn, the notation an
·
= bn will
stand for equality in the exponential scale, that is, limn→∞
1
n log
an
bn
= 0. Similarly, an
·
≤ bn means
that lim supn→∞
1
n log
an
bn
≤ 0, and so on. The indicator function of an event G will be denoted by
I{G}. The notation [x]+ will stand for max{0, x}.
The empirical distribution of a sequence x ∈ X n, which will be denoted by Pˆx, is the vector of
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relative frequencies Pˆx(x) of each symbol x ∈ X in x. The type class of x ∈ X
n, denoted T (Pˆx),
is the set of all vectors x′ with Pˆx′ = Pˆx. Information measures associated with empirical distri-
butions will be denoted with ‘hats’ and will be subscripted by the sequences from which they are
induced. For example, the entropy associated with Pˆx, which is the empirical entropy of x, will be
denoted by Hˆx(X). Similar conventions will apply to the joint empirical distribution, the joint type
class, the conditional empirical distributions and the conditional type classes associated with pairs
(and multiples) of sequences of length n. Accordingly, Pˆxy will be the joint empirical distribution
of (x,y) = {(xi, yi)}
n
i=1, and T (Pˆxy) will denote the joint type class of (x,y). Similarly, T (Pˆx|y|y)
will stand for the conditional type class of x given y, Hˆxy(X,Y ) will designate the empirical joint
entropy of x and y, Hˆxy(X|Y ) will be the empirical conditional entropy, Iˆxy(X;Y ) will denote
empirical mutual information, and so on. We will also use similar rules of notation in the context
of a generic distribution, QXY (or Q, for short): we use T (QX) for the type class of sequences
with empirical distribution QX , HQ(X) – for the corresponding empirical entropy, T (QXY ) – for
the joint type class x, T (QX|Y |y) – for the conditional type class of x given y, HQ(X,Y ) – for
the joint empirical entropy, HQ(X|Y ) – for the conditional empirical entropy, IQ(X;Y ) – for the
empirical mutual information, and so on. We will also use the customary notation for the weighted
divergence,
D(QY |X‖PY |X |QX) =
∑
x∈X
QX(x)
∑
y∈Y
QY |X(y|x) log
QY |X(y|x)
PY |X(y|x)
. (1)
III. Setup and Objectives
Consider the following system model for biometric identification. An enrollment source sequence,
x = (x1, . . . , xn), which is a realization of the random vector X = (X1, . . . ,Xn), that emerges from
a discrete memoryless source (DMS), PX , with a finite alphabet X , is fed into an enrollment encoder,
E , that produces two outputs: a secret key, s (a realization of a random variable S), and a helper
message, w (a realization of W ), taking on values in finite alphabets, Sn = {0, 1, . . . , e
nRs} and
Wn = {0, 1, . . . , e
nRw}, respectively, where Rs is the secret–key rate, and Rw is the helper–message
rate. This encoding operation designates the enrollment stage.
We consider the ensemble of enrollment encoders, {E}, generated by random binning, where for
each source vector x ∈ X , one selects independently at random, both a secret key and a helper
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message, under the uniform distributions across Sn and Wn, respectively. In other words, denoting
by w = f(x) and w = f(x), the randomly selected bin assignments for both outputs, it is assumed
that the 2|X |n random variables {f(x), g(x)}x∈Xn are all mutually independent.
The authentication decoder, A, which is aware of the randomly selected encoder, E , is fed by
two inputs: the helper message w and an authentication source sequence, y = (y1, . . . , yn) (a
realization of Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn)), that is produced at the output of a discrete memoryless channel
(DMC), PY |X , with a finite output alphabet Y, that is fed by x. The output of the authentication
decoder is sˆ = U(y,w) (a realization of Sˆ), which is an estimate (possibly, randomized) of the
secret key, s. If sˆ = s, access to the system is granted, otherwise, it is denied. This decoding
operation stands for the authentication stage.
The optimal estimator of s, based on (y,w), in the sense of minimum FR probability, Pr{Sˆ 6=
S}, is the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) estimator, given by
sˆMAP = U(y,w)
∆
= argmax
s
P (s,w|y) = argmax
s
∑
x∈Xn
P (x|y) · I{f(x) = w} · I{g(x) = s}, (2)
where P (x|y) (shorthand notation for PX |Y (x|y)) is the posterior probability of X = x given
Y = y, that is induced by the product distribution, PXY (and the subscript XY will sometimes
be suppressed for simplicity, when there is no risk of compromising clarity).
In this paper, we expand the scope and study a more general class of decoders. This is a class of
generalized stochastic likelihood decoders [10], [13], [14], [16], where the decoder randomly selects
its estimate sˆ according to the posterior distribution
P˜ (s|y,w) =
∑
x∈Xn exp{na(Pˆxy)} · I{f(x) = w} · I{g(x) = s}∑
x∈Xn exp{na(Pˆxy)} · I{f(x) = w}
, (3)
where the function a(·), henceforth referred to as the decoding metric, is an arbitrary continuous
function of the joint empirical distribution Pˆxy. Throughout the sequel, we will refer to the
numerator of the r.h.s. as P˜ (s,w|y), and to the denominator as P˜ (w|y). For
a(Pˆxy) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
Pˆxy(x, y) lnP (x|y), (4)
we have the ordinary likelihood decoder in spirit of [13], [14], [16]. For
a(Pˆxy) = β
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
Pˆxy(x, y) lnP (x|y), (5)
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β being a free parameter (sometimes referred to as the inverse temperature parameter [12] due to
the analogy in statistical mechanics), we extend this likelihood decoder to a parametric family of
decoders, where β controls the skewedness of the posterior. In particular, β → ∞ leads to the
ordinary MAP decoder, sˆMAP. Other interesting choices are associated with mismatched metrics,
a(Pˆxy) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
Pˆxy(x, y) lnP
′(x|y), (6)
P ′ being different from P , and
a(Pˆxy) = −βHˆxy(X|Y ), (7)
which for β → ∞ approaches the universal minimum entropy decoder (see also discussion around
eqs. (5)–(7) of [10]).
An unauthorized user (i.e., an imposter), who claims for a given subscriber identity and wishes
to break into the system, does not have the correlated biometric data y. The best s/he can do is
to estimate s based on the only data s/he has, which is the helper message w, and then forges any
fake biometric data y˜, which together with w, would cause the decoder to output this estimate of
s. More precisely, the imposter first estimates s according to
s˜ = V (w)
∆
= argmax
s
P (s|w) = argmax
s
∑
x∈Xn
P (x) · I{f(x) = w} · I{g(x) = s}, (8)
and then generates any y˜ ∈ Yn such that U(y˜,w) = s˜, and uses it as the biometric signal for
authentication.
The objectives of the paper are to obtain: (i) ensemble–tight, exponential error bounds for the
average FR probability, P¯FR = Pr{Sˆ 6= S}, associated with the generalized stochastic likelihood
decoder (3), as well as an expurgated bound following the methodology of [10, Theorem 2] (see
also the correction [11]), and (ii) an exponential error bound for the average FA probability of (8),
P¯FA = Pr{S˜ = S}. Finally, we provide an outline of a derivation of the leakage, I(S;W ), for a
typical code, E , in the large n limit.
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IV. False–Reject Error Analysis
A. Random Coding Exponent
Consider the system configuration described in Section III, along with the generalized stochastic
likelihood decoder (3). Define the functions
E(Rw, QX0Y )
∆
= min
QX|Y
[Rw −HQ(X|Y ) + [a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )]+]+ (9)
and
EFR
r
(Rw)
∆
= min
QX0Y
{D(QX0Y ‖PXY ) + E(Rw, QX0Y )}. (10)
Our first result is the following.
Theorem 1 Consider the system configuration described in Section III. Then,
lim
n→∞
[
−
ln P¯FR
n
]
= EFR
r
(Rw). (11)
Before providing the proof, a few points should be discussed.
1. First, observe that Theorem 1 asserts that EFR
r
(Rw) is the exact random coding FR exponent,
not just a lower bound. This is due to the fact that all steps of the analytic derivation are ensemble–
tight in the exponential scale, thanks to the ability to avoid the use of the Jensen inequality and
other well known tools that are traditionally used to facilitate the analysis, at the possible price of
compromising tightness (see the proof of Theorem 1 below).
2. It is interesting to observe that the FR random coding exponent, EFR
r
(Rw), depends only on
Rw, not on Rs. This fact is not trivial, but the intuition is the following: in order to estimate S
correctly, with high probability, from the given data (Y ,W ), there should be essentially no am-
biguity, first of all, in defining what the correct S is. This will be the case if there is essentially
only one source vector X that is responsible for the given W and then this X would dictate the
correct S = g(X). This in turn would happen with high probability as long as Rw > H(X|Y ).
Otherwise, if more than one source vector (in the same conditional type class given Y as the correct
one) is mapped by the encoder to the same helper message, then at least one such source vector is
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likely to be mapped to a different secret key message, and then the decoding would be ambiguous.
It appears then that correct estimation of S is essentially equivalent to correct estimation of X,
as in ordinary Slepian–Wolf decoding [6] (see also [15] and references therein), where there is no
secret key at all (or alternatively, Rs → ∞). Indeed, the Slepian–Wolf coding component of the
joint source–channel coding system, analyzed in [10, Section IV] under the generalized likelihood
decoder, contributes the very same error exponent as asserted in Theorem 1.
3. It is interesting to examine a few decoding metrics. Consider the choice a(Q) = −HQ(X|Y ). In
this case, we have
min
QX|Y
[Rw −HQ(X|Y ) + [a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )]+]+
= min
QX|Y
[Rw −HQ(X|Y ) + [HQ(X|Y )−HQ(X0|Y )]+]+
= min
QX|Y
[Rw −min{HQ(X|Y ),HQ(X0|Y )}]+
= [Rw −min{max
QX|Y
HQ(X|Y ),HQ(X0|Y )}]+
= [Rw −HQ(X0|Y )]+, (12)
which, together with (10), yields the same random coding exponent as the optimal MAP decoder
for Slepian–Wolf decoding (see also [10] and [13]). More generally, the same comment applies to
a(Q) = −βHQ(X|Y ) for every β ≥ 1, where β → ∞ pertains to the deterministic universal mini-
mum entropy decoding, the source–coding dual to maximum mutual information (MMI) universal
decoding (see, e.g., [15] and references therein). For a(Q) = βEQ lnP (X|Y ), we have a finite–
temperature likelihood decoder. For β → ∞, we are back to the ordinary MAP decoder, which
yields
lim
β→∞
min
QX|Y
[Rw −HQ(X|Y ) + [a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )]+]+
= lim
β→∞
min
QX|Y
[Rw −HQ(X|Y ) + β[EQ lnP (X0|Y )−EQ lnP (X|Y )]+]+
= min
{QX|Y : EQ lnP (X|Y )≥EQ lnP (X0|Y )}
[Rw −HQ(X|Y )]+, (13)
which, together with (10), yields the random coding exponent of the MAP decoder, as expected.
As argued above, this is the same as the exponent achieved by a(Q) = −βHQ(X|Y ) for all β ≥ 1.
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The remaining part of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The expected FR probability is given by
P¯FR = E


∑
s6=S
P˜ (s|W ,Y )

 (14)
where the expectation is w.r.t. both the randomness of (S,W ,Y ) and the randomness of the code,
E . For given realizations, X = x and Y = y, let us denote
P¯FR(x,y)
∆
= E


∑
s′ 6=g(x)
P˜ (s′|f(x),y)

 , (15)
where now the expectation is merely w.r.t. the randomness of E . Now, following eq. (3),
P˜ (s′|f(x),y) =
∑
x′∈Xn exp{na(Pˆx′y)} · I{f(x
′) = f(x)} · I{g(x′) = s′}∑
x′∈Xn exp{na(Pˆx′y)} · I{f(x
′) = f(x)}
=
∑
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x), s
′)
ena(Pˆxy) +
∑
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x))
, (16)
where the summations over {QX|Y } are across all conditional types {T (QX|Y |y)} of sequences of
length n, and where
N(T (QX|Y |y),w, s
′) =
∣∣∣∣T (QX|Y |y)⋂{x′ : f(x′) = w, g(x′) = s′}
∣∣∣∣, (17)
and
N(T (QX|Y |y),w) =
∣∣∣∣T (QX|Y ⋂{x′ : f(x) = w, x′ 6= x}
∣∣∣∣. (18)
Let us first consider the average FR probability for a given (x,y) while fixing the realizations of
w = f(x) and s = g(x):
P¯FR(x,y, s,w) = E


∑
s′ 6=s
∑
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x), s
′)
ena(Pˆxy) +
∑
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x))


=
∫ 1
0
dt · Pr


∑
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x))
ena(Pˆxy ) +
∑
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x))
≥ t


= n ·
∫ ∞
0
dθe−nθ · Pr


∑
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x))
ena(Pˆxy ) +
∑
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x))
≥ e−nθ


9
·
=
∫ ∞
0
dθe−nθ · Pr


∑
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x)) > e
n[a(Pˆxy)−θ]


·
=
∫ ∞
0
dθe−nθ · Pr
{
max
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x)) > e
n[a(Pˆxy)−θ]
}
·
=
∫ ∞
0
dθe−nθ · Pr
⋃
QX|Y
{
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x)) > e
n[a(Pˆxy)−θ]
}
·
= max
QX|Y
∫ ∞
0
dθe−nθ · Pr
{
N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x)) > e
n[a(Pˆxy)−a(QXY )−θ]
}
. (19)
Now, observe thatN(T (QX|Y |y), f(x)) is a binomial random variable with |T (QX|Y |y)|
·
= enHQ(X|Y )
trials and probability of success e−nRw . Similarly as argued, e.g., in [10] (see page 5042, bottom
half of the right column therein), we have
Pr
{
N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x)) > e
n[a(QX0Y )−a(QXY )−θ]
}
·
= e−nE(QXY ,QX0Y ,θ,Rw), (20)
where we have replaced Pˆxy by the notation QX0Y (X0 being an auxiliary random variable that
represents the underlying source vector x), and where
E(Rw, QX0Y , QXY , θ) =
{
[Rw −HQ(X|Y )]+ θ > a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )− [HQ(X|Y )−Rw]+
∞ θ ≤ a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )− [HQ(X|Y )−Rw]+
(21)
Thus,
P¯FR(x,y, s,w)
·
= max
QX|Y
∫ ∞
[a(QX0Y )−a(QXY )−[HQ(X|Y )−Rw]+]+
dθe−nθ · e−n[Rw−HQ(X|Y )]+ . (22)
whose exponential decay rate is according to
min
QX|Y
{[a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )− [HQ(X|Y )−Rw]+]+ + [Rw −HQ(X|Y )]+}
= min
QX|Y
{
[Rw −HQ(X|Y ) + a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )]+ HQ(X|Y ) > Rw
Rw −HQ(X|Y ) + [a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )]+ HQ(X|Y ) ≤ Rw
= min
QX|Y
[Rw −HQ(X|Y ) + [a(QX0Y )− a(QXY )]+]+
= E(Rw, QX0Y ). (23)
The second to the last equality follows from the identity [u− v]+ = [[u]+ − v]+, holding whenever
v ≥ 0, which is applied to the first line of the second expression with the assignments u = a(QX0Y )−
a(QXY ) and v = HQ(X|Y ) − Rw (see also [13] as well as the text after eq. (11) of [10] for a
very similar argument). Since this exponential behavior, of P¯FR(x,y, s,w), is independent of the
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particular realizations, s and w, it holds also for the expectation w.r.t. the randomness of S and
W , namely, it also characterizes the exponential rate of P¯FR(x,y). Finally, it readily follows from
the method of types [3] that the expectation w.r.t. the randomness of (X,Y ) decays according to
the exponent
EFR
r
(Rw) = min
QX0Y
{D(QX0Y ‖PXY ) + E(Rw, QX0Y )}, (24)
which is as defined in (10). This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ✷
B. Expurgated Bound
Our expurgated bound will be asserted for each type class, T (QX), of source vectors separately.
As in channel coding, where expurgation is associated with elimination of some ‘bad’ codewords
of a randomly generated code, here too, we might need to eliminate a small fraction of bad source
vectors from T (QX), in order to guarantee a certain FR performance level for each one of the
remaining source vectors in T (QX). One may wonder what would be the justification for such an
elimination of source vectors, as these are generated by the source and given to us, and they are
not under our control. Nonetheless, in the context of biometric identification system described in
Section III, where {x} are the enrollment signals, there are at least two possible ways to justify
this elimination of a small fraction of the members of the type class.
1. In the enrollment stage, if the individual that subscribes to the system, has generated a
‘forbidden’ source vector x (in the sense that has been eliminated in the expurgation process),
s/he might be asked to kindly provide his/her biometric signal once again, with the hope
that this time a ‘legitimate’ source vector will be generated. The probability that this would
happen is small in the first place, provided that the fraction of vectors eliminated from T (QX)
is small. The probability of bothering the subscriber more than once with the request of a
repeated measurement is even much smaller.
2. Considering the fact that x may be digitized with some precision (which is in line with the
finite alphabet assumption anyway), it is conceivable to think of the enrollment data as having
undergone a certain stage of vector quantization. Once x is thought of as an output of a vector
quantizer, then not necessarily every member of T (QX) must be a legitimate codebook vector
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in the first place. Among other things, one might rule out source vectors that contribute a
high FR probability.
In order to present the expurgated exponent, a few additional definitions are needed. For a
given QY , let us define
α(Rw, QY )
∆
= sup
{QX|Y : HQ(X|Y )>Rw}
[a(QXY ) +HQ(X|Y )]−Rw, (25)
γ(QXY )
∆
= max{a(QXY ), α(Rw, QY )}, (26)
Λ(QXX′)
∆
= min
QY |XX′
{γ(QXY )−HQ(Y |X,X
′)−EQ lnP (Y |X)− a(QX′Y )}, (27)
and for a given QX , define
EFR
ex
(Rw, QX) = inf
{QX′|X : HQ(X
′|X)≥Rw}
{Λ(QXX′)−HQ(X
′|X) +Rw}. (28)
Finally, let PFR(E|x) denote the FR probability of a given enrollment encoder E , conditioned on
the input source vector X = x.
Theorem 2 Consider the system configuration described in Section III and let {δn}n≥1 be a positive
sequence tending to zero such that nδn →∞. Then, there exists a code E such that for every QX ,
PFR(E|x) ≤ exp{−nE
FR
ex
(Rw, QX) + o(n)}, (29)
for every x ∈ T (QX) \ B(QX), where B(QX) is a certain subset of T (QX), whose size does not
exceed e−nδn |T (QX)|.
A few points concerning Theorem 2 should be discussed.
1. It is interesting to note that the expression of EFR
ex
(Rw, QX) has some analogy to the Csisza´r–
Ko¨rner–Marton (CKM) expurgated exponent of channel coding [3, p. 165, Problem 10.18]. The
term Λ(QXX′) plays the same role as the expected Bhattacharyya distance in the CKM expur-
gated exponent, whereas HQ(X
′|X) is analogous to the coding rate R in channel coding and Rw
is parallel to the empirical mutual information between channel codewords. Roughly speaking, the
contribution of a single incorrect source vector x′ to the FR probability is about exp{−nΛ(QXX′)
provided that (x,x′) ∈ T (QXX′) (the pairwise error event). This probability should be multiplied
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by the typical number of such incorrect source vectors within T (QX′|X |x) that are encoded into
the same given helper message and hence may cause confusion. This number is of the exponential
order exp{n[HQ(X
′|X) −Rw]}, provided that HQ(X
′|X)−Rw > 0, and it vanishes otherwise.
2. Note that in contrast to Theorem 1, here we are no longer arguing that the result is ensemble–
tight. There is actually one step in the derivation where exponential tightness might be compro-
mised. Specifically, in one of the steps of this analysis, the denominator of (3) is lower bounded by
a relatively simple single–letter bound that holds true for the vast majority of encoders, {E}, in the
ensemble. By doing this, possible gaps to these bounds may not be fully exploited, and we cannot
rule out the possibility that this causes some loss of tightness. On the other hand, the derivation
of the expurgated bound includes a certain degree of freedom that does not exist in the random
coding bound of Theorem 1, and upon exploiting this degree of freedom, we obtain a result, which
is at least as strong as the random coding bound, and sometimes strictly so.
3. The sequence δn tends to zero in order not to slow down the exponential decay rate, but it is
also required that nδn → ∞ in order to guarantee that the set of ‘bad’ source vectors, B(QX),
would be merely a minority of T (QX) for large n.
4. We now show that for every Rw, the overall expurgated exponent (taking into account all
types, {QX}) cannot be worse than E
FR
r
(Rw), at least for the metric a(QXY ) = −βHQ(X|Y ),
which was shown to be as good as the optimal decoding metric in the ordinary random coding
sense. Note that is in contrast to the traditional expurgated exponent, which improves on the
random coding exponent only at a certain range of rates, but is inferior to the random coding
exponent elsewhere (see also [10], where a similar finding was observed for a particular numerical
example). For the above–mentioned choice of a(QXY ), one easily verifies that α(Rw, QY ) = −βRw
and γ(QXY ) = −βmin{HQ(X|Y ), Rw}, and so,
Λ(QXX′) = min
QY |XX′
{γ(QXY )−HQ(Y |X,X
′)−EQ lnP (Y |X) + βHQ(X
′|Y )}
= min
QY |XX′
{β[HQ(X
′|Y )−min{HQ(X|Y ), Rw}] +
IQ(X
′;Y |X) +D(QY |X‖PY |X |QX)}. (30)
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Upon optimizing β, we obtain
Eex(Rw, QX) = sup
β∈IR
inf
{QX′|X : HQ(X
′|X)≥Rw}
{Λ(QXX′)−HQ(X
′|X)} +Rw
= sup
β∈IR
inf
{QX′Y |X : HQ(X
′|X)≥Rw}
{D(QY |X‖PY |X |QX) + IQ(X
′;Y |X) +
β[HQ(X
′|Y )−min{HQ(X|Y ), Rw}]−HQ(X
′|X) +Rw}
≥ inf
{QX′Y |X : HQ(X
′|X)≥Rw}
{D(QY |X‖PY |X |QX) + IQ(X
′;Y |X) +
HQ(X
′|Y )−min{HQ(X|Y ), Rw} −HQ(X
′|X) +Rw}
= inf
{QX′Y |X : HQ(X
′|X)≥Rw}
{D(QY |X‖PY |X |QX) + IQ(X
′;Y |X) +HQ(X
′|Y ) +
[Rw −HQ(X|Y )]+ −HQ(X
′|X)
= inf
{QX′Y |X : HQ(X
′|X)≥Rw}
{D(QY |X‖PY |X |QX) +HQ(X
′|Y )−HQ(X
′|X,Y ) +
[Rw −HQ(X|Y )]+
= inf
{QX′Y |X : HQ(X
′|X)≥Rw}
{D(QY |X‖PY |X |QX) + IQ(X
′;X|Y ) + [Rw −HQ(X|Y )]+}
≥ inf
{QX′Y |X : HQ(X
′|X)≥Rw}
{D(QY |X‖PY |X |QX) + [Rw −HQ(X|Y )]+}. (31)
Without the constraint, HQ(X
′|X) ≥ Rw, the last expression is exactly the random coding FR
exponent for a given type QX , and upon taking into account the probabilistic weight of each type,
the overall exponent associated with the last line (again, without the constraint) is exactly Er(Rm)
of Theorem 1 for the optimal, MAP decoder. By inspection of eq. (31), we therefore observe that
there are four origins of the gap between the expurgated exponent and the random coding exponent:
(i) the decoder actually being analyzed might be suboptimal for the expurgated ensemble, (ii) the
optimal β (for the given family of decoders) might not necessarily be β∗ = 1 (the first inequality in
the above chain). In fact, the optimal β∗ is expected to depend on Rw.
1 (iii) the term IQ(X
′;X|Y )
which may not necessarily vanish for the optimal QX′Y |X (the second inequality), and (iv) the
constraint HQ(X
′|X) ≥ Rw. For example, if Rw > ln |X |, the expurgated exponent is infinite while
the random coding exponent is finite.
5. As can be seen in the proof of Theorem 2, the asserted expurgated exponent is obtained from
1The fact that optimal β may not necessarily be infinite (except the case (5)), is interesting on its own right, as
it means that the the stochastic decoder may outperform the deterministic one for a given (suboptimal) decoding
metric.
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an intermediate expression that depends on a free parameter ρ that undergoes optimization. It
is interesting to observe what happens when we set ρ = 1 instead of optimizing over ρ. This
would correspond to the ordinary ensemble average, which needs no expurgation. In this case,
EFR
ex
(Rw, QX) would be replaced by
E1(Rw, QX) = sup
β∈IR
inf
QX′|X
{
Λ(QXX′)− [HQ(X
′|X)−Rw]+ + [Rw −HQ(X
′|X)]+
}
= sup
β∈IR
inf
QX′|X
{
Λ(QXX′) +Rw −HQ(X
′|X)
}
, (32)
where we have used the trivial identity [u]+− [−u]+ ≡ u. Therefore, the expression of E1(Rw, QX)
is exactly like that of EFR
ex
(Rm, QX), except that the constraint, HQ(X
′|X) ≥ Rw, is removed. It
follows that EFR
ex
(Rw, QX) is expected to improve on E1(Rw, QX) at high rates, where the con-
straint may be active. It also follows (similarly as in (31)) that E1(Rw, QX) is never smaller than
the random coding FR exponent given the type QX , since the latter lacks this constraint as well.
The reason that this expurgated exponent is nowhere worse than the random coding exponent is
that we do not use the inequality [
∑
x′ 6=x u(x
′)]1/ρ ≤
∑
x′ 6=x[u(x
′)]1/ρ (holding for ρ ≥ 1), like
in the traditional expurgated bound. This inequality causes a loss of tightness. Without it, the
supremum over ρ is always achieved at ρ→∞.
6. The case of ordinary, deterministic MAP decoding is obtained again as of special case of (5) in
the limit β →∞. As in (13), when the objective function to be minimized over {QXX′Y )}, contains
a term like β ·G(QXX′Y ) (for some functional G(·)), then in the limit of β →∞, it is replaced by
a constraint of the form G(QXX′Y ) ≤ 0.
The remaining part of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. For a given code, E , and a given the underlying source vector x, we have
PFR(E|x) =
∑
y
P (y|x)
∑
s6=g(x)
P˜ (s|f(x),y) (33)
=
∑
s6=g(x)
∑
y
P (y|x) ·
P˜ (s, f(x)|y)
exp{na(Pˆxy)}+ Zx(y)
, (34)
where
Zx(y) =
∑
x′ 6=x
exp{na(Pˆx′y)} · I{f(x
′) = f(x)}. (35)
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Let ǫ > 0 be arbitrarily small. It is shown in the Appendix2 that
Pr
{
Zx(y) < exp{nα(Rw + ǫ, Pˆy)} for some (x,y)
}
≤ |X × Y|n · exp{−enǫ + nǫ+ 1}. (36)
Now, denoting
Gǫ =
{
E : Zx(y) ≥ exp{nα(Rw + ǫ, Pˆy)} for all (x,y)
}
, (37)
we have:
E
{
[PFR(E|x)]
1/ρ
}
= E

 ∑
s 6=g(x)
∑
y
P (y|x) ·
P˜ (s, f(x)|y)
exp{na(Pˆxy)}+ Zx(y)


1/ρ
=
∑
E
P (E)

 ∑
s6=g(x)
∑
y
P (y|x) ·
P˜ (s, f(x)|y)
exp{na(Pˆxy)}+ Zx(y)


1/ρ
=
∑
E∈Gǫ
P (E)

 ∑
s6=g(x)
∑
y
P (y|x) ·
P˜ (s, f(x)|y)
exp{na(Pˆxy)}+ Zx(y)


1/ρ
+
∑
E∈Gcǫ
P (E)

 ∑
s 6=g(x)
∑
y
P (y|x) ·
P˜ (s, f(x)|y)
exp{na(Pˆxy)}+ Zx(y)


1/ρ
≤
∑
E∈Gǫ
P (E)

 ∑
s6=g(x)
∑
y
P (y|x) ·
P˜ (s, f(x)|y)
exp{na(Pˆxy)}+ exp{nα(Rw + ǫ, Pˆy)}


1/ρ
+
∑
E∈Gcǫ
P (E) · 11/ρ
≤
∑
E
P (E)

 ∑
s6=g(x)
∑
y
P (y|x) ·
P˜ (s, f(x)|y)
exp{na(Pˆxy)}+ exp{nα(Rw + ǫ, Pˆy)}


1/ρ
+
enRs · |X × Y|n · exp{−enǫ + nǫ+ 1}. (38)
Considering the arbitrariness of ǫ, the expression in the square brackets is exponentially equivalent
to
∑
s6=g(x)
∑
y
P (y|x)e−nγ(Pˆxy)P˜ (s, f(x)|y)
=
∑
s6=g(x)
∑
y
P (y|x)e−nγ(Pˆxy)
∑
x′
exp{na(Pˆx′y)}I{f(x
′) = f(x), g(x′) = s}
=
∑
s6=g(x)
∑
x′
I{f(x′) = f(x), g(x′) = s}
∑
y
P (y|x) exp{n[a(Pˆx′y)− γ(Pˆxy)]}. (39)
2See also [10, Appendix B] for a similar argument related to channel coding.
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Now, the inner most summation (over y) can be assessed using the method of types [3]. Accordingly,
referring to (27), we have
e−nΛ(Pˆxx′)
·
=
∑
y
P (y|x) exp{n[a(Pˆx′y)− γ(Pˆxy)]}, (40)
which is the contribution of a single incorrect source vector x′ to the FR probability. This yields
∑
s6=g(x)
∑
x′
I{f(x′) = f(x), g(x′) = s} · e−nΛ(Pˆxx′)
≤
∑
x′
e−nΛ(Pˆxx′ )I{f(x′) = f(x)}
=
∑
QX′|X
e−nΛ(QXX′)N(T (QX′|X |x), f(x)), (41)
where we have defined
N(T (QX′|X |x), f(x))
∆
=
∣∣∣∣T (QX′|X |x) ∩ {x′ : f(x′) = f(x)}
∣∣∣∣. (42)
On substituting this back into the bound on E
{
[PFR(E|x)]
1/ρ
}
, we get
E
{
[Pe(E|x)]
1/ρ
}
≤ E



 ∑
QX′|X
e−nΛ(QXX′)N(T (QX′|X |x), f(x))


1/ρ


·
=
∑
QX′|X
e−nΛ(QXX′)/ρE
{
[N(T (QX′|X |x), f(x))]
1/ρ
}
=
∑
QX′|X
e−nΛ(QXX′)/ρ
∫ ∞
0
dt · Pr
{[
N(T (QX′|X |x), f(x))
]1/ρ
≥ t
}
=
∑
QX′|X
e−nΛ(QXX′)/ρ
∫ ∞
0
dt · Pr
{
N(T (QX′|X |x), f(x)) ≥ t
ρ
}
·
=
∑
QX′|X
e−nΛ(QXX′)/ρ
∫ ∞
−∞
dθ · enθ · Pr
{
N(T (QX′|X |x), f(x)) ≥ e
nθρ
}
. (43)
Let us focus on the term Pr[N(T (QX′|X |x), f(x)) ≥ e
nθρ]. SinceN(T (QX′|X |x), f(x)) is a binomial
random variable with |T (QX′|X |x)|
·
= enHQ(X
′|X) trials and probability of success e−nRw , we have
Pr
[
N(T (QX′|X |x), f(x)) ≥ e
nθρ
]
·
= e−nE(Rw,QXX′ ,ρθ) (44)
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where
E(Rw, QXX′ , ρθ) =
{
[Rw −HQ(X
′|X)]+ [HQ(X
′|X)−Rw]+ ≥ ρθ
∞ [HQ(X
′|X)−Rw]+ < ρθ
=
{
[Rw −HQ(X
′|X)]+ θ ≤ [HQ(X
′|X)−Rw]+/ρ
∞ θ > [HQ(X
′|X)−Rw]+/ρ
(45)
On substituting this back into the expression of E
{
[PFR(E|x)]
1/ρ
}
, we get
E
{
[PFR(E|x)]
1/ρ
}
·
≤
∑
QX′|X
e−nΛ(QXX′)/ρ ·
∫ [HQ(X′|X)−Rw]+/ρ
−∞
dθ · enθe−n[Rw−HQ(X
′|X)]+
·
= exp
{
−n min
QX′|X
[
Λ(QXX′) + ρ[Rw −HQ(X
′|X)]+ − [HQ(X
′|X)−Rw]+
]
/ρ
}
∆
= e−nEx(Rw,QX ,ρ)/ρ. (46)
It follows then that
E

 1|T (QX)|
∑
x∈T (QX)
[PFR(E|x)]
1/ρ


·
≤ e−nEx(Rw,QX ,ρ)/ρ, (47)
and so, there exists a code E with
1
|T (QX)|
∑
x∈T (QX)
[PFR(E|x)]
1/ρ
·
≤ e−nEx(Rw,QX ,ρ)/ρ. (48)
For a given such E and QX , let us order the members of T (QX), as x1,x2,x3, . . ., according to
PFR(E|x1) ≥ PFR(E|x2) ≥ PFR(E|x3) ≥ . . . and let M be a temporary short-hand notation for
|T (QX)|. Let B(QX) be the subset of T (QX) formed by the first M
′ = e−δnM members of T (QX)
according to this order, i.e., B(QX) = {x1,x2, . . . ,xM ′}. We then have
e−nEx(Rw,QX ,ρ)/ρ
·
≥
1
M
M∑
m=1
[PFR(E|xm)]
1/ρ
≥
1
M
M ′∑
m=1
[PFR(E|xm)]
1/ρ
≥
1
M
M ′∑
m=1
[PFR(E|xM ′+1)]
1/ρ
=
1
M
·M ′ · [PFR(E|xM ′+1)]
1/ρ
= e−nδn
[
max
x∈T (QX)\B(QX )
PFR(E|x)
]1/ρ
, (49)
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and so, maxx∈T (QX)\B(QX ) PFR(E|x) decays at an exponential rate which is at least as large as
sup
ρ≥0
Ex(Rw, QX , ρ)
= sup
ρ≥0
inf
QX′|X
{
Λ(QXX′)− [HQ(X
′|X) −Rw]+ + ρ[Rw −HQ(X
′|X)]+
}
(50)
= inf
{QX′|X : HQ(X
′|X)≥Rw}
{
Λ(QXX′)− [HQ(X
′|X)−Rw]+
}
= inf
{QX′|X : HQ(X
′|X)≥Rw}
{Λ(QXX′)−HQ(X
′|X) +Rw}
= Ex(Rw, QX), (51)
completing the proof of Theorem 2.
V. False–Accept Error Analysis
In this section, we analyze the ensemble performance of the system from the viewpoint of an
imposter who makes an attempt to estimate the secret key without access to the side information
Y , and we are interested in the exponential decay rate of the FA probability for the average code.
As described in Section III, here we assume that the imposter estimates S using the MAP estimator,
S˜ (see (8)), based on the helper message only. Accordingly, as defined in Section III, we denote
P¯FA = Pr{S˜ = S}, i.e., the probability of correct decoding (FA), averaged over the ensemble of
codes {E}. Let us define
EFA(Rw, Rs) = min
QX
[D(QX‖PX) + min{Rs, [HQ(X)−Rw]+}] . (52)
Our main result, in this section, is the following.
Theorem 3 Consider the system configuration described in Section III. Then,
P¯FA ≤ exp{−nEFA(Rw, Rs) + o(n)}. (53)
The expression of this exponential error bound is quite intuitive and it can easily be understood
to hold even if the imposter is informed about the type3 QX of X. There are about e
n[HQ(X)−Rw]+
source sequences of type QX (including the correct one), whose helper message is the given W . If
3Here a genie–aided decoding argument does not harm the tightness of the FA exponent, because one can guess
the type correctly with probability of success that decays only polynomially.
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[HQ(X) −Rw]+ > Rs, then all possible e
nRs members of the secret–message set would be likely to
appear as encoded secret messages among those sequences, approximately evenly, so the probability
of guessing the correct one is about e−nRs . If, on the other hand, [HQ(X) −Rw]+ < Rs, then it is
very likely that there would be only about en[HQ(X)−Rw]+ different s–messages, so the probability
of guessing the correct one is the reciprocal, e−n[HQ(X)−Rw]+. It is easy to see that EFA(Rw, Rs)
vanishes for Rw > H(X), as expected.
It is also interesting to observe that here, in contrast to the exponential FR bounds of Section
IV, the exponent depends on both Rw and Rs, and not only on Rw. As expected, it is increasing in
Rs and decreasing in Rw.
The FA error exponent of Theorem 3 can also be presented in a Gallager–style form:
EFA(Rw, Rs) = min
Q
[D(QX‖PX) + min{Rs, [HQ(X)−Rw]+}]
= min
QX
min
0≤s≤1
max
0≤ρ≤1
{D(QX‖PX) + sRs + (1− s)ρ[HQ(X)−Rw]}
= min
0≤s≤1
max
0≤ρ≤1
min
QX
{D(QX‖PX) + sRs + (1− s)ρ[HQ(X)−Rw]}
= min
0≤s≤1
max
0≤ρ≤1
{
−[1− ρ(1− s)] ln
[∑
x
PX(x)
1/[1−ρ(1−s)]
]
+ sRs − ρ(1 − s)Rw
}
= min
0≤s≤1
max
s≤ρ≤1
{
−ρ ln
[∑
x
PX(x)
1/ρ
]
+ sRs − (1− ρ)Rw
}
. (54)
Proof of Theorem 3. In the derivation below, we let xQ denote an arbitrary representative source
vector x of type QX . The choice of this representative within T (QX) is completely immaterial
since all members of T (QX) are equiprobable. Similarly as before, we also denote by N(QX ,w, s)
the number of members of T (QX) that are encoded into (w, s).
P¯FA = E
{∑
w
max
s
P (w, s)
}
= E


∑
w
max
s
∑
QX
PX(xQ) ·N(QX ,w, s)


= lim
β→∞
E


∑
w

∑
s

∑
QX
PX(xQ) ·N(QX ,w, s)


β


1/β


·
= lim
β→∞
E


∑
w

∑
s
∑
QX
P βX(xQ) ·N
β(QX ,w, s)


1/β


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= lim
β→∞
E


∑
w

∑
QX
∑
s
P βX(xQ) ·N
β(QX ,w, s)


1/β


·
= lim
β→∞
E


∑
w
∑
QX
[∑
s
P βX(xQ) ·N
β(QX ,w, s)
]1/β

= lim
β→∞
E


∑
w
∑
QX
PX(xQ)
[∑
s
Nβ(QX ,w, s)
]1/β

= lim
β→∞
∑
w
∑
QX
PX(xQ) ·E


[∑
s
Nβ(QX ,w, s)
]1/β

=
∑
w
∑
QX
PX(xQ) ·E
{
max
s
N(QX ,w, s)
}
=
∑
w
∑
QX
PX(xQ) ·
|T (QX)|∑
n=1
Pr
{
max
s
N(QX ,w, s) ≥ n
}
=
∑
w
∑
QX
PX(xQ) ·
|T (QX)|∑
n=1
Pr
⋃
s
{N(QX ,w, s) ≥ n}
≤
∑
w
∑
QX
PX(xQ) ·
|T (QX)|∑
n=1
min
{
1, enRsPr [N(QX ,w, s) ≥ n]
}
. (55)
Now, for QX ∈ G
∆
= {QX : HQ(X) > Rs + Rw}, clearly, Pr[N(QX ,w, s) ≥ n] is large for ev-
ery n ≤ en[HQ(X)−Rw−Rs−ǫ] (for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0 and large n), and so, the minimum
between 1 and enRsPr [N(QX ,w, s) ≥ n] is certainly 1. Hence, these terms, of the summation
over n, contribute altogether a quantity of the exponential order of en[HQ(X)−Rw−Rs]. For larger
n, Pr[N(QX ,w, s) ≥ n] decays super–exponentially, and so, these terms contribute a negligible
amount. Consequently, considering the factor of enRw that stems from the summation over w,
one term that contributes to the expression of the last line above is
∑
QX∈G
PX(xQ)e
n[HQ(X)−Rs],
which is of the exponential order of exp{−nminQX∈G [D(QX‖PX) + Rs]}. The other term comes
from the types that belong to Gc. For QX ∈ G
c, there are sub–exponentially few terms that
contribute min{1, enRs · en[HQ(X)−Rs−Rw]} = e−n[Rw−HQ(X)]+ , and so, the overall contribution
is maxQX∈Gc e
nRwe−n[HQ(X)+D(QX‖PX)]e−n[Rw−HQ(X)]+ , which is exp{−nminQX∈Gc [D(QX‖PX) +
[HQ(X) −Rw]+]}. Thus, the overall performance is
P¯FA
·
≤ exp
(
−nmin
QX
[D(QX‖PX) + min{Rs, [HQ(X)−Rw]+}]
)
, (56)
completing the proof of Theorem 3.
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VI. Information Leakage for the Typical Code
In this last section, which is very brief, we provide an outline for the evaluation of the third figure
of merit of our model of an authentication system, namely, the secrecy, or the information leakage,
I(W ;S), associated with the typical code, E , in the ensemble.
We envision the typical code as a code with the following properties:
1. For any given type class T (QX) whose size is larger than e
n(Rs+Rw), the number of mem-
bers of T (QX) mapped each one of the e
n(Rs+Rw) pairs (s,w) is exactly the same (uniform
distribution of (S,W ) within the type), so that H(S,W |X ∈ T (QX)) = n(Rs +Rw).
2. For any given type class T (QX) whose size is smaller than e
n(Rs+Rw), each member of T (QX)
is mapped to a different pair (s,w), so that H(S,W |X ∈ T (QX)) = log |T (QX)|.
The leakage will then be upper bounded as follows:
I(S;W ) = H(S) +H(W )−H(S,W )
≤ nRs + nRw −H(S,W |PˆX )
= n(Rs +Rw)−Emin
{
n(Rs +Rw), log |T (PˆX )|
}
= E
{[
n(Rs +Rw)− log |T (PˆX )|
]
+
}
≈ nE
{
[Rs +Rw − HˆX (X)]+
}
. (57)
Now, assuming that H(X) > Rs + Rw, the probability of falling in a type class T (Pˆx) with
Rs +Rw − Hˆx(X) > 0 is of the exponential order of exp{−nEsec(Rs +Rw)}, where
Esec(R)
∆
= min{D(QX‖PX) : HQ(X) ≤ R}, (58)
and therefore,
I(S;W )
·
≤ n
∑
x
PX(x)[Rs +Rw − Hˆx(X)] · I{Rs +Rw − Hˆx(X) > 0}
≤ n(Rs +Rw) · Pr{Rs +Rw − HˆX (X) > 0}
·
= exp{−nEsec(Rs +Rw)}, (59)
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which means that as long as H(X) > Rs + Rw, strong security is guaranteed in the sense that
I(S;W ) tends to zero even without normalization by n, as it decays exponentially fast. The
secrecy exponent depends on Rs and Rw only via their sum, Rs +Rw.
Appendix
Proof of eq. (36). The proof is similar to the proof of a similar argument in the context of channel
coding [10, Appendix B]. First, observe that
Zx(y) =
∑
x′ 6=x
exp{na(Pˆx′y)} · I{f(x
′) = f(x)} =
∑
QX|Y
ena(QXY )N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x)). (A.1)
Thus, considering the randomness of {f(x)},
Pr
{
Zx(y) ≤ exp{nα(R + ǫ, Pˆy)}
}
= Pr


∑
QX|Y
N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x))e
na(QXY ) ≤ exp{nα(R + ǫ, Pˆy)}


≤ Pr
{
max
QX|Y
N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x))e
na(QXY ) ≤ exp{nα(R + ǫ, Pˆy)}
}
= Pr
⋂
QX|Y
{
N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x))e
na(QXY ) ≤ exp{nα(R+ ǫ, Pˆy)}
}
= Pr
⋂
QX|Y
{
N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x)) ≤ exp{n[α(R + ǫ, Pˆy)− a(QXY )]}
}
. (A.2)
Now, N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x)) is a binomial random variable with |T (QX|Y |y)
·
= enHQ(X|Y ) trials and
success rate of e−nRw . We now argue that by the very definition of α(R + ǫ, Pˆy), there must exist
some Q∗X|Y such that for Q
∗
XY = Pˆy × Q
∗
X|Y , HQ∗(X|Y ) ≥ R + ǫ and HQ∗(X|Y ) − R − ǫ ≥
α(R + ǫ, Pˆy)− a(Pˆy ×Q
∗
X|Y ). Let then Q
∗
X|Y be such a conditional distribution. Then,
Pr
⋂
Q
{
N(T (QX|Y |y), f(x)) ≤ exp{n[α(R + ǫ, Pˆy)− a(Pˆy ×QX|Y )]}
}
≤ Pr
{
N(T (Q∗X|Y |y), f(x)) ≤ exp{n[α(R + ǫ, Pˆy)− a(Pˆy ×Q
∗
X|Y )]}
}
. (A.3)
Now, we know that HQ∗(X|Y ) ≥ R + ǫ and HQ∗(X|Y ) − R − ǫ ≥ α(R + ǫ, Pˆy) − a(Pˆy × Q
∗
X|Y ).
By the Chernoff bound (see, e.g., [9, Chap. 6]), the probability in question is upper bounded by
exp
{
−enHQ∗(X|Y )D(e−αn‖e−βn)
}
, (A.4)
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where α = HQ∗(X|Y ) + a(Pˆy ×Q
∗
XY )− α(R + ǫ, Pˆy) and β = R. Noting that α− β ≥ ǫ, we can
easily lower bound the binary divergence as follows (see [9, Section 6.3]):
D(e−αn‖e−βn) ≥ e−βn{1− e−(α−β)n[1 + n(α− β)]}
≥ e−nR[1− e−nǫ(1 + nǫ)], (A.5)
where in the last passage, we have used the decreasing monotonicity of the function f(t) = (1+t)e−t
for t ≥ 0. Thus,
Pr
{
N(T (Q∗X|Y |y), f(x)) ≤ exp{n[α(R, Pˆy)− a(Pˆy ×Q
∗
X|Y )− ǫ]}
}
≤ exp
{
−enHQ∗(X|Y ) · e−nR[1− e−nǫ(1 + nǫ)]
}
≤ exp
{
−enǫ[1− e−nǫ(1 + nǫ)]
}
= exp {−enǫ + nǫ+ 1} . (A.6)
Finally, the factor of |X × Y|n in eq. (36) comes from the union bound, taking into account all
|X × Y|n possible pairs {(x,y)}. This completes the proof of eq. (36).
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